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ABSTRACT
This study seeks to investigate the impact of auditee business risk, audit risk,
and auditor business risk evaluation on auditor-auditee negotiation outcomes. A
model is developed and tested that characterizes the auditor-auditee negotiation
outcome as a process of risk evaluation and risk adaptation.
Participants in this study were students of the University of Diponegoro
accountant professional education of 60 people who represent partner and manager
of Big 4 audit firms. The results show that the partners (participants) considered the
relationship between audit risk and auditee business risk. Also, our results indicate
that auditee business risk has a significant effect on auditor business risk evaluation
and has a significant effect on auditor-auditee negotiation outcomes. So, auditors will
be less likely to accept an auditee’s aggressive reporting practice when the auditee’s
business risks are high. On the other hand, results show that audit risk evaluation
don’t affect auditor-auditee negotiation outcome. Finally, auditor business risk has a
nonsignificant effect on auditor-auditee negotiation outcome.
This study provides evidence that despite the expectation of conservatism
required by generally accepted auditing principles (GAAP), certain environmental
factors may cause auditors to acquiesce to auditee preferences and allow more
aggressive reporting. From stakeholders (investors, regulators) perspective, this is
not necessarily an optimal criterion for decisions that impact the financial statements.
The expectations of stakeholders are that auditors will select the most informative
alternative.
The implication for practice is that accounting firms may need to strengthen
their internal oversight mechanisms (e.g., peer reviews, concurring partner reviews)
to ensure that auditors’ decisions are aligned with the firm’s, as well as stakeholders’
expectations of audit quality. So, auditors must pay more attention to financial
statements when business risk is high.
Keywords: Auditor-Auditee Negotiation, Auditee Business Risk, Audit Risk,
Auditor Business Risk, Prospect Theory.
1. INTRODUCTION
Audited financial statements are a joint product of both the auditor and the
auditee (McCracken, Salterio, & Gibbins, 2008), and auditors sometimes play an
active role in managing the auditee’s financial reporting choices (Nelson, Elliott, &
Tarpley, 2002). In the process of financial reporting, circumstances may arise that
lead to divergent preferences between auditees and auditors on accounting and
reporting issues. The resolution of such financial reporting issues can be especially
difficult when generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) are ambiguous
(Johnstone, Bedard, & Biggs, 2002; Nelson & Kinney, 1997), since both parties may
make different judgments depending on their preferences.cDespite the importance of
auditor-auditee negotiation in financial reporting, limited attention has been given to
the need for effective negotiations in situations that entail subjective matters (e.g.,
accounting estimates, imprecise accounting standards) (Gibbins, McCracken, &
Salterio, 2005).
The purpose of this study is to examine how certain environmental factors
influence negotiation outcomes. More specifically, we try to study the impact of
auditee business risk, audit risk, and auditor business risk on auditor-auditee
negotiation outcome in Indonesian context.
Developing a framework for understanding the impact of risks on negotiation
outcome is important because auditor independence and ability to resist to auditee
pressures are the most fundamental and vital asset possessed by the auditing
profession. Auditor-auditee interactions are fundamental to preserving audit quality,
as these interactions include negotiations over changes in the financial statements
necessary for the auditor to provide an unqualified opinion.
Research demonstrates that environmental conditions (e.g., financial
dependence) potentially lead to judgment based decisions that affect the content and
credibility of financial statements (Hackenbrack & Nelson, 1996; Holm & Laursen,
2007; Johnstone, Sutton, & Warfield, 2001). For example, judgmental situations can
reduce actual or perceived audit quality via independence risk. However,
environmental characteristics possibly mitigate independence related environmental
conditions (Johnstone, Sutton, & Warfield, 2001).
This examination is important because negotiations materially affect the
financial statements as auditors actively participate in their auditees’ financial
reporting choices (Demski & Frimor, 1999; Nelson & Kinney, 1997; Nelson, Elliott,
& Tarpley, 2002; Trotman, Wright, & Wright, 2005). However, relatively little is
known about how important contextual features such as risk affect auditor-auditee
negotiation. Understanding features that affect the negotiation outcome is important
because it provides insight on audit practice interventions that can be employed to
improve audit quality and reduce litigation exposure on the contentious issues
generally resolved via auditor-auditee negotiation.
An emerging line of research is investigating how auditors and their auditees
interact to resolve disputed financial reporting issues, building from the auditor-
auditee negotiation model developed in Gibbins, Salterio, and Webb (2001);
Sahnoun and Zarai (2009). That model highlights the importance of accounting
contextual features that may affect negotiations (e.g., auditee and auditor negotiation
capabilities, financial reporting regulation, and risk, among others). Gibbins,
Salterio, and Webb (2001) validate their model using survey data of auditors’ self
reported negotiations, and call for future research that examines negotiation
outcomes, and that considers contextual features such as the riskiness of the
negotiation context. Sahnoun dan Zarai (2009) validate their model using experiment
data (using 200 Tunisian auditors as participants), and suggests for future researach
that global evaluation of business risk is needed, specifically in international research
is needed to analyze the risk/negotiation outcomes relationship in other countries
where different standards, structures, cultures, and legal environmental prevail.
We extend this emerging line of research using an experimental task. We rely
on Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and related findings in the
negotiation literature (Neale & Bazerman, 1991), which help to link motivations for
risk seeking versus risk aversive behavior with negotiation decision making to
motivate our expectation that auditors in the high risk context will exhibit superior
performance in terms of negotiation outcome.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Negotiation is a process by which a joint decision is made by two or more
parties. The parties first verbalize contradictory demands and then move toward
agreement by a process of concession making or a search for new alternatives. The
very nature of the audit function can necessitate negotiation between the auditor and
the auditee to resolve disputed financial reporting issues. For example, before an
auditor is willing to express an unqualified opinion on an auditee’s financial
statements, any disputed accounting issues must be resolved. The resolution of these
issues may result in a negotiation between the auditor and the auditee, where the
auditee is likely to attempt to persuade the auditor to accept his/her position and vice
versa.
Negotiations may have a variety of outcomes (e.g., impasse or mutual
agreement) (Thompson, 1990). Generally, negotiators reach an agreement with the
other party if it is in their best interest to do so (Thompson, 1990). The auditor and
the auditee have joint interests; auditors are generally interested in auditee retention,
and auditees want to obtain an unqualified audit report (Gibbins, Salterio,&Webb,
2001). Therefore, it is likely that auditor-auditee negotiations will result in mutual
agreement. The process of reaching a mutual agreement may involve both parties
making concessions so that each party gets at least a part of his or her preferred
outcome.
MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES
Model in this reseach includes two phases: a risk evaluation phase and a risk
adaptation phase. The first phase characterizes how risks are integrated to form an
overall evaluation of the riskiness of the auditee. The second characterizes adaptation
strategies in auditor-auditee negotiation that auditors may use in response to the
evaluated risks.
Risk Evaluation
The first phase of the model includes the evaluation of relevant risks. These
risks include the auditee’s business risk, audit risk, and the auditor’s business risk
(Colbert, Luehlfing, & Alderman, 1996; Huss & Jacobs, 1991). Auditee’s business
risk is the risk that the auditee’s economic condition will deteriorate in either the
short or long term (e.g., as proxied by profitability and liquidity) (Johnstone, 2000).
Auditor’s business risk is the risk that the audit firm will suffer a loss resulting from
the engagement (e.g., as proxied by engagement profitability and potential
litigation).
Research shows that the auditee’s financial condition can affect the
evaluation of audit risk, and vice versa (Kotchetova, Kozloski, & Messier, 2006;
O’Keefe, King, & Gaver, 1994; Wu, Roebuck, & Summers, 2002).While this
research led in the context of the auditor-auditee negotiation, professional standards
indicate that auditors should evaluate these risks. It seems logical that auditee’s
business risk and audit risk, both unique to the auditee, might affect each other as the
auditor evaluates the auditee related risks. For example, an auditee with weak
internal controls that operate in an inherently risky industry may have difficulty
obtaining debt financing at reasonable interest rates, thereby affecting the auditor’s
evaluation of the auditee’s financial prospects. Alternatively, an auditee in
deteriorating financial condition might reduce its administrative staffing, affecting
the strength of its internal control systems and the auditor’s evaluation of control risk
(Johnstone, 2000).
This discussion suggests the following hypothesis:
H1a: Partners’ evaluations of auditee’s business risk will relate positively to
partners’ evaluations of audit risk and vice versa.
Additional research provides evidence about how the auditee related risks
might affect auditors’ evaluations of the risk that the audit firm will suffer a loss on
the engagement (auditor’s business risk). Prior research focusing on litigation against
audit firms demonstrates that as the auditee’s financial condition declines, the
likelihood that the auditor will suffer a loss related to the engagement increases (Pratt
& Stice, 1994; Schipper, 1991). Increases in audit risk factors also increase the
likelihood that the auditor will suffer a loss (Kruetzfeldt & Wallace, 1986). Since
auditors’ evaluations of auditee’s business risk and audit risk could be related (i.e.,
Hla), the relative influence of auditee’s business risk on auditor’s business risk and
the relative influence of audit risk on auditor’s business risk reported in prior studies
might differ when the impact of auditee’s business risk and audit risk are measured
simultaneously, as is done in this study.
Asare, Hackenbrack, and Knechel (1994) report that they do consider how an
auditee’s business risk and audit risk affect their own firm’s risk of loss. Given the
litigious and highly price competitive environment in which accounting firms
operate, these links seem logical. For example, an auditee with a higher level of audit
risk is more likely to require costly auditing procedures and is more likely to be
associated with an audit failure which results in negative publicity and costly legal
judgments against the accounting firm. Similarly, auditee financial distress can lead
to immediate declines in auditor profitability via reduced or unpaid audit fees, and
can also result in costly legal judgments against the accounting firm (Fukukawa,
Mock, & Wright, 2006).
This discussion suggests the following hypotheses:
H1b: Partners’ evaluations of audit risk will relate positively to partners’
evaluations of auditor’s business risk.
H1c: Partners’ evaluations of auditee’s business risk will relate positively to
partners’ evaluations of auditor’s business risk.
Adaptation Phase
The second phase of the auditor-auditee negotiation outcome model is an
adaptation phase. Drawing from accounting contextual features identified by
Gibbins, Salterio, and Webb (2001); Sahnoun and Zarai (2009) as important in
auditor-auditee negotiations, we examine how risks evaluations influence auditor
decision during auditor-auditee negotiations. Research demonstrates that risk
influences decision making behavior (e.g., Gibbins, McCracken, & Salterio, 2008;
Hackenbrack & Nelson, 1996; Johnstone, Bedard, & Biggs, 2002) and is an
important aspect of the overall audit environment (Bell et al., 2002).
Prospect Theory suggests that people are risk averse in situations where they
are confronting potential gains and that they are risk seeking in situations where they
are confronting potential losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The negotiation
literature shows that the risk adverse course of action is to accept an offered
settlement, hereas the risk seeking course of action is to hold out for future, potential
concessions (Neale & Bazerman, 1991). This implies that people in riskier situations
will adopt a more contending strategy as they hold out for superior negotiated
outcomes. This expectation is confirmed in an experiment by Neale and Bazerman
(1991) who show that individuals in a negatively framed condition (a situation
described as involving serious financial losses) are more contending and achieve
superior negotiated outcomes compared to individuals in a more positively framed
financial condition.
Building on the findings regarding the role of risk in financial reporting
choice (prospect theory), we expect that in riskier situations, auditors will work to
achieve a more conservative financial reporting outcome, and since that alternative is
more conservative, they will be more confident that the final negotiated outcome is
acceptable under GAAP.
Auditee Business Risk and Auditor-Auditee Negotiation.
Huss and Jacobs (1991) reported that auditee business risks may affect
auditors’ decisions on whether to accept or to continue audit engagements, since an
auditee’s business risks, in turn, affect auditor business risks due to the potential loss
of audit fees and litigation, should the company become insolvent. For example, in
making auditee acceptance decisions, auditors assess that high auditee business risks
could result in high auditor business risks (Johnstone, 2000).
Prior research has also reported that the likelihood of auditor litigation is
greatly increased for failing firms, as investors, creditors, and others seek to recoup
financial damages. Asare, Haynes, and Jenkins (2007) studied the impact of auditee
business risk and auditor business risk on auditor decision. Their results show that
the auditor pays more effort to examine financial statements when auditee business
risk is high. In the same way, Chang and Hwang (2003) report that auditee business
risk has a significant effect on auditor decision to accept auditee’s practices. Braun
(2001) shows that the auditors are incited to accept auditee’s aggressive practice
when auditee financial position is good.
Hence, we predict that the likelihood that auditors will accept an auditee’s
aggressive reporting practices may decrease as the level of the auditee’s business
risks increase.
H2a: Partners’ evaluations of auditee business risk will relate negatively to auditor-
auditee negotiation outcome.
Audit Risk and Auditor-Auditee Negotiation
Audit risk is defined as the auditor giving “an inappropriate audit opinion on
financial statements” (Mulyadi, 2007). This risk has three key components: inherent
risk, control risk, and detection risk (Mulyadi, 2007). Inherent and control risk are
risks which lie within the company itself. Detection risk lies with the auditors. The
extent of substantive testing carried out by an auditor is a function of the assessment
of the level of inherent and control risk within the company.
Several studies examined the effect of audit risk or more precisely detection
risk on auditor decision. Sankaraguruswamy, Raghunandan, and Whisenant (2005)
studied the factors associated with auditor-auditee negotiation outcome; they found
that audit risk affected auditor-auditee negotiation outcome.
If inherent risk and control risk are weak, the auditor could, owing to the fact
that the detection risk is weak, reduce his accounts controls (substantive tests); it
could in this case accept an auditee’s aggressive reporting practice. On the other
hand, if inherent risk and control risk are medium or high, the auditor should carry
out an important work in the form of substantive tests. In this case, the auditor must
be careful and conservative in the examination of the methods practiced by the
auditee (Houston, 1999).
H2b: Partners’ evaluations of audit risk will relate positively to auditor-auditee
negotiation outcome.
Auditor Business Risk and Auditor-Auditee Negotiation
Engagement risk may exist even if there are no misstatements in the financial
statements and the audit is conducted according to professional standards (Rittenberg
& Schwieger, 2001); it is an important part of the audit environment (Bell et al.,
2002).
Research examining the influence of engagement risk on auditor decision
making (Johnstone, 2000) provides evidence to support the importance of
engagement risk in the audit setting. Engagement risk is likely to affect negotiated
outcomes because research demonstrates that engagement risk influences auditors’
judgment based decisions (Hackenbrack & Nelson, 1996; Johnstone, Bedard, &
Biggs, 2002). Johnstone, Bedard, and Biggs (2002) examine auditors’ generation of
financial reporting alternatives in a setting in which an audit auditee proposes an
aggressive financial reporting alternative for a complex revenue recognition issue.
They find that higher engagement risk is associated with the generation of a greater
number and range of financial reporting alternatives, particularly for high knowledge
auditors.
Hackenbrack and Nelson (1996) find those auditors’ incentives to make
aggressive reporting decisions vary as a function of engagement risk. If engagement
risk is moderate, auditors prefer an aggressive reporting method. Conversely, if
engagement risk is high, auditors prefer a conservative reporting method.






Participants in this study were students of the University of Diponegoro
accountant professional education of 60 people who represent partner and manager
of Big 4 audit firms.
Experimental Design and Procedures
The experiment is a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design, yielding eight case versions
that range from relatively low to relatively high levels of risk. Each participant was
assured of confidentiality and was requested to complete a questionnaire in a timely
manner.
The research instruments were developed based on the Johnstone (2000)
study and Sahnoun and Zarai (2009). Each participant chose at random two case
studies and completed them. The cases were constructed with the assistance of two
partners’ auditors, one of which is from Big 4 audit firm. Each case began with a
description of the company, including information about growth prospects, reasons
for switching auditors, and fiscal year end information. A description of the
company’s management followed, including information about their relationship

















Financial information included a summary of sales, net income, and financial
ratios, including industry comparison information. Following the financial
information was about the company’s internal control structure, the degree of
judgment required to value significant company assets, the audit firm’s expertise,
and expected competition from other audit firms. After reading each case study,
partners (participants) evaluated risks and then made decisions. Finally, participants
completed a debriefing questionnaire.
Independent Variables
The independent variables include auditee’s business risk (high, low), audit
risk (high, low), and auditor’s business risk (high, low). Information used to
manipulate auditee’s business risk and audit risk was developed based on prior
studies and professional standards. The auditee’s business risk manipulation included
information about financial ratios and trends (Johnstone, 2000; Pratt & Stice, 1994),
management’s long term planning activities (Ponemon & Schick, 1991), and
industry competition (Huss & Jacobs, 1991). The audit risk manipulation included
information about the auditee’s industry (Maletta & Kida, 1993), the past auditee
auditor relationship (Johnstone, 2000), the degree of judgment required to value
significant accounts (Pratt & Stice, 1994), management’s attitude toward internal
controls and the internal audit department (Maletta & Kida, 1993).
Dependent Variables
After participants received the above manipulations within the case, the
participants’ evaluations of the three risks were measured, yielding the following
latent constructs: auditee’s business risk evaluation; audit risk evaluation; and
auditor’s business risk evaluation.
Indicators of the auditee’s business risk evaluation and the audit risk
evaluation constructs have been developed based on prior studies that have
operationalized these constructs (Pratt & Stice, 1994). Indicators of the auditee’s
business risk evaluation include participants’ assessments of the company’s short
term liquidity, short term profitability, and long term financial viability. Indicators of
the audit risk evaluation include participants’ assessments of the likelihood of
material misstatement, the company’s inherent risk, and the company’s control risk.
Auditor-auditee negotiation outcome is being measured by one indicator. A
scale of 7 points will be used to specify negotiation outcomes.
Statistical Method
This reseach to test the model (Figure 1) used the maximum likelihood
procedure in AMOS 16 (Ghozali, 2008).
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Measurement Model and Descriptive Statistics
The results of evaluating the measurement model are described below (Table
1). Table 1 shows that the means of the three indicators of auditee business risk are
close to each other 3.89, 4.43, 4.21 proving the bond between different items relative
to auditee business risk. For other variables, which have averages of 3.93, 3.97, 4.23
for audit risk and 4.07 and 3.98 for auditor business risk. For negotiation variable,
the mean is about 4.07, so more medium degree of agreement exists between
auditors and auditees.
As far as the standard deviation, we note a slight variation of variables in our
sample. Indeed, the more the degree of fluctuation measured by the standard
deviation is weak, the more the estimate quality is good.
Examination of the correlation matrix reveals that partners viewed the
auditee’s business risk evaluation, the audit risk evaluation, and the auditor’s
business risk evaluation as distinct constructs. For example, the indicators of the
auditee’s business risk evaluation, Abrl (short term liquidity), Abr2 (short term
profitability), and Abr3 (long term financial viability), are highly correlated to each
other (correlations of 0.69, 0.73, and 0.72, respectively) and are less highly
correlated to the audit risk evaluation or auditor’s business risk evaluation indicators.
Similarly, the indicators of the audit risk evaluation, Arl (material
misstatement), Ar2 (inherent risk), and Ar3 (control risk), are highly correlated to
each other (correlations of 0.86, 0.81, and 0.76, respectively) and are less highly
correlated to the auditee’s business risk evaluation or auditor’s business risk
evaluation indicators. The indicators of auditor-auditee negotiation outcomes are
highly correlated to auditee business risk.
The indicators of the auditee’s business risk, audit risk evaluations and
auditor Business risk have standardized factor loadings that are well above the .60
benchmark (see Table 1). So, no modifications are required to achieve a good fitting
measurement model for these constructs.
TABLE 1
Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics
Abr1 Abr2 Abr3 Ar1 Ar2 Ar3 Aobr1 Aobr2 N Means StandarsDeviation Loading
Abr1 60 3.89 1.54 0.80
Abr2 .69 60 4.43 1.59 0.81
Abr3 .73 .72 60 4.21 1.70 0.83
Ar1 .07 .04 .03 60 3.93 1.69 0.83
Ar2 .08 .01 .06 .86 60 3.97 1.72 0.80
Ar3 .03 .06 -.02 .81 .76 60 4.23 1.58 0.81
Aobr1 -.02 -.02 .12 .63 .59 .45 60 4.07 1.65 0.81
Aobr2 .18 .23 .34 -.09 -.04 -.04 .10 60 3.98 1.79 0.83
Aano .24 .27 .15 .19 .08 .06 .04 .07 60 4.07 1.56 0.84
Sumber: Data Diolah, 2011
Abr: Auditee business risk
Ar: Audit risk
Aobr: Auditor business risk
Aano: Auditor-auditee negotiation outcomes
Structural Model
Results of testing the structural model provide evidence about whether the
auditor-auditee negotiation outcomes model in Figure 1 is consistent with the
experimental data. The overall model goodness of fit measures (probability ≥ 0.05,
RMSEA ≤ 0.08, dan GFI, AGFI, TLI ≥ 0.90).
TABLE 2
Statistic Results of the SEM Analysis
t p
H1a: Auditee business risk/ Audit risk 0.28 0.00
H1b:  Auditee business risk/ Auditor business risk 0.69 0.00
H1c:  Audit risk/ Auditor business risk 0.54 0.00
H2a: Auditee business risk/ Auditor-auditee negotiation
outcomes
- 0.39 0.00
H2b:  Audit risk/ Auditor -auditee negotiation outcomes -0.11 0.63
H2c: Auditor business risk/ Auditor-auditee negotiation
outcomes
0.03 0.97
Sumber: Data Diolah, 2011
Hypothesis 1 tests the risk evaluation phase of the model (see Table 2).
Hypothesis 1a proposes that partner’s evaluations of auditee’s business risk and audit
risk will affect each other. The path from the audit risk evaluation to the auditee’s
business risk evaluation is significant (t = + 0.28, p < 0.05), providing partial support
for the hypothesis. The reciprocal path, from the auditee’s business risk evaluation to
the audit risk evaluation, is also significant, so hypothesis 1a is supported.
Hypotheses lb and 1c propose that partner’s evaluations of auditee’s business risk
and audit risk will affect partners’ evaluations of auditor’s business risk. The paths
from the auditee’s business risk evaluation to the auditor’s business risk evaluation
are significant (t = +0.69, p < 0.05), so supports H1b. The significance of the paths
from the audit risk evaluation to the auditor’s business risk evaluation (t = +0.54, p <
0.05) supports H1c.
Hypotheses 2 test the adaptation phase of the model. Hypothesis 2 tests
whether partners’ evaluations of risks directly affect the auditor-auditee negotiation
outcomes. Hypothesis 2a predicts that the auditee’s business risk evaluation (i.e.,
partners’ assessments of the auditee’s profitability, liquidity, and financial viability)
will relate negatively to the decision. Hypothesis 2a is supported, since the path from
the auditee’s business risk evaluation to auditor-auditee negotiation outcomes (t = -
0.39, p < 0.05) is significant.
H2b predicts that the audit risk evaluation (i.e., partners’ assessments of the
auditee’s inherent and control risk) will relate negatively to the negotiation. The path
from the audit risk evaluation to auditor-auditee negotiation (H2b) is not significant.
Hypothesis 2c tests whether auditors’ evaluations of their own firm’s risk of
loss (auditor’s business risk) affect the auditor-auditee negotiation. The result shows
that the auditor’s business risk evaluations are not related to auditor-auditee
negotiations.
5. CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS, AND IMPLICATION
This study develops and experimentally tests a risk-based model of the
outcome of auditor-auditee negotiation. Auditee’s business risk, audit risk, and
auditor’s business risk are manipulated and the relationships between partners’
evaluations of these risks and the auditee auditor negotiation outcome are measured.
The findings show that partners evaluated the auditee’s risks substantially as
expected and adapt to those risks in negotiating with auditees.
The results relating to the risk evaluation phase of the model show that
partners’ evaluations of audit risk affect their evaluations of the auditee’s business
risk and that both of these auditee-related risk evaluations do affect partners’
evaluations of auditor’s business risk.
Finding related to the risk adaptation phase of the model concerns the relative
influence of the auditee’s business risk on auditor-auditee negotiation outcomes. This
result confirms the expectation of prospect theory, so auditors in riskier situations
will adopt a more contending negotiation strategy, and accordingly will go through
more rounds of negotiation with the auditee, and will switch their bargaining position
less often as they demonstrate reluctance to acquiesce to the auditee. In riskier
situations, auditors will work to achieve a more conservative financial reporting
outcome. So, when auditee business risk is high, Indonesian auditors (specifically for
auditors at Center Java) became more conservative in order to preserve their
reputation and reduce litigation risk. The company went bankrupt without any
attempt at prevention on the part of the auditor. The government and small
shareholders who criticized the external auditors did not adequately support claims
audited, and certifying a false balance sheet, turned against him, and the courts have
sentenced him to imprisonment. The Indonesian audit market is very competitive and
an auditor seeks to preserve his reputation, his auditees, and consequently his
financial conditions. Indonesian case makes a partial support for prospect theory.
The conclusions based on the findings of this study are limited by the study’s
design. First, participants in this study is students of the University of Diponegoro
accountant professional education of 60 people, with the result that unfavourable.
Second, generalization of the results regarding the evaluated risks is limited to the
indicator variables measured in the study. Future research would benefit by using the
indicator variables found to be significant in the measurement model and by
experimenting with indicator variables not included in this study, for example the
individual effect of each risk on negotiation outcome.
This study makes several significant contributions. First, it respond to calls
for negotiation research that investigates the role of risk, which is particularly
relevant today as auditors operate in a highly litigious political environment where
negotiation between auditees and their auditors is viewed as a potentially
problematic aspect of the dual role of both parties in the financial reporting process
Second, understanding how auditors respond to risky versus less risky auditees
during auditor-auditee negotiation is important and has important audit quality and
public policy implications. Third, despite the expectation of conservatism required
by GAAP, the findings suggest that certain environmental factors may cause auditors
to acquiesce to auditee preferences and allow more aggressive reporting. From a
stakeholders (e.g., investors, regulators, state) perspective this is not necessarily an
optimal criterion for decisions that impact the financial statements.
The results of this study should provide implications for regulatory policy
makers. Auditor independence is a crucial factor for auditor accountability that not
only affects the results of auditor-auditee negotiations, but also affects the audit
report users such as investors, creditors, and other related parties who rely on the
audited financial statements. Also, our results support the need for the recent
regulations in Indonesian that seek to increase the demand for independent audits;
additional measures are necessary to curb opinion shopping, including the need to
further develop regulations that require detailed public disclosure of auditor-auditee
disagreements. Understanding features that affect the negotiation outcome provides
insight on audit practice interventions that can be employed to improve audit quality
and reduce litigation exposure on the contentious issues generally resolved via
auditor-auditee negotiation.
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